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I, HE current economic situation of high interest
rates, high unemployment and large federal deficits
has prompted acall for achange in the mix ofstabiliza-
tion policies. The current mnixseems to be oneof“easy”
fiscal policy and “tight” monetary policy. Many
analysts feel the mix should be shifted toward “tighter”
fiscal policy and “easier” monetary policy, ostensibly
for purposes of putting the economy on the path to
recovery.
Jamnes Toiin, for example, recently stated that:
the mix ofpolicies is unhealthy. To achieve a solid
recovery, such as the administration projects, and to
achieye it withommt astronomical interest rates and se-
rious crowding out, we need an easier monetary policy
comhined with a tighter fiscal policy.’
Economists at the Brookings Institution have ex-
pressed a similar view:
Beyond 1982, the key to an improved economicsitu-
ation must lie in a realigmument of economic policy—
a shift in the mix of fiscal and monetary policy, by
matching reductions of future budget deficits with
an easier monetary policy. As presently constituted,
fiscal and monetary policies appear to he on a collision
course 2
The Congressional Budget Office talks of the clash
between mnonetary and fiscal policy:
Statements from the Federal Reserve suggest that
monetary policy will continue its anti-inflationary
‘James Tohin, “The wrong Mix lbr Recovery,” Challenge (May-’
June 1982), p. 25,
tmJoseph A, Pechmanand Barry P. I3oswomth, “The Budget and the
Economy,” in JosephA. Pechmnan,ed,, Setting Nationa/ Priorities:
The 1983 Budget (The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 43’
stance in the coming years. . By contrast, the budget
measures enacted last summer will provide consider-
able stimulus to economic activity over the next few
years. This suggests the possibility ofa clash between
monetar and fiscal policy unless the Congress emmacts
further spending cuts and tax increases to reduce
federal borrowing or the Federal Reserve adopts a less
restrictive monetary policy. Ifthe clash materializes, it
will he reflected in high real interest rates that crowd
out private investment.‘~
The notion ofpolicy mix is well-known and has been
apart ofthe macroeconomics literature fora nummber of
years, hut seldom has it generated controversy as it has
now. Despite its recognition, however, little is known
about the exact terms ofthe mnix or what indicators of
monetary and fiscal policy are most appropriate to umse
in defining it. For example, neither Tobin, the Brook-
ings econoniists, nor the Congressional Budget Office
state by how much fiscal policy should be tightened
and to what extent monetary policy should be eased.
The gravity of the current economic situation re-
quires that the notion of policy mix” ie given a more
precise interpretation. Is cmmrrentpolicy what it seems?
How does one measure the ease and tightness of
monetary and fiscal policies? What measures of eco-
nomic performance are relevant to the mix argu-
ment—interest rates, GNP, the ratio ofinvestment to
CNP? What horizon is pertinent—short-run, long-
run, aspecific number ofyears? Can policies really be
traded off to achieve a specific economic objective?
These are the types of questions that are given short
shrift when the mix ofpolicies is discussed.
3Congressional Budget Office. The Prospectsfor Economic Recor-
cry (US’ Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 27.
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The purpose ofthis article is to provide some spec-
ificity to the policy mix question. As a point of de-
parture, some indicators of monetary’ and fiscal policy
are examined, amud a historical classification of policy
mix is developed. A conventional macroeconomic
treatment ofpolic~’mix is then presented, providing
the basis for developmnent of testable hypotheses.
These hypotheses are tested, and somne policy implica-
tiomus are derived.
DEFIPS INC EASE AND TIGHTNESS
OF i.2OLICY
Many sumnnsary measures of nionetary and fiscal
policy have been developed over the years. The mnaimi
reason fUr seeking such ameasure is toprovide a quick
interpretation ofcurrent policy stamuce. The criteria for
selection are that the nieasure primnarily reflect move-
ments in the instruments of policy’ andl that it not he
influenced greatly by thepaceofeconomic activity.4 In
other words, the indicator should reflect the thrust of
the policy on the economy rather than the reverse.
)%:Icasurcmcnt oj 1~Uo~.atiu’u ,~i.trans
Measuring the stance of monetary policy revives
many controversial issues, one ofthe oldest of which
centers on the choice between interest rates and
monetary aggregates Although the level of interest
rates is often alluded to as an indicator of monetary
policy, mostanalysts have fhund ittohe unreliable as a
policy measure, since a great mnany forces influmenee
interest rates besides mnonetaryactions. The monetary
ag,gregates, on the other hand, tend to reflect more
accurately changes in the policy imustrnments—open
market operations, reserve requiremnents and the dis-
count rate—without being influenced undumly by out-
side forces.’
Chief among the candidates for a monetary policy
indicator are the money stock (Ml) and the monetary
base. The mnonetary base has appeal because it reflects
more accurately changes in the instrumnents of policy
than does Ml. The Ml measure, however, tends to be
more closely related to CNP.6
4
See, for example, Albert E. Burger, “The Implementation Prob-
lem of Monetary Policy,” this Review (Nlarch 1971), pp. 20—30,
‘
5
See R. w. Hafer, “selecting a Monetary Indicator: A Test ofthe
New Momietary Aggregates,” this Review (Fehruary 1981), pp.
12—18.
°Forreferences to the literature, along with a contrasting inter-
pretation, see William E. Cullison, “Money, the Monetary Base,
andNominal GNP,” Federal Reserve BankofRichmond Economic
Review (May/June 1982), pp. 3—13,
Labeling momuetary’ policy as easy’ or tight is, of
course, quitearbitrary. Theprocedure followed here is
to examimue the historical record of Ml and develop a
classification of relatively easy and relatively tight
policy on the basis of this record. To make this classifi-
cation mneaningfml,one mimst accoumut fUrchanges in the
trend ofmonetary growth, particularly ifone intends to
ficus on the imnpact of monetary’ policy’ on real vari-
ables. Consumers and investors come to expect certaimu
groxvth rates ofthe mnonetarv aggregates, basing such
expectations on past experience. It is the deviation of
the monetary aggregate around this expected growth
rate that a,ffeets real economic activity.
Table 1 summarizes monetary policy since 1956.
The first column shows the four-quarter rate ofchange
of Nil minus its trend (20-quarter rate of change) fUr
the period ending in the fourth quarter of each year
(except for 1982).’ The second column, which classifies
monetary policy as easy, tight or neutral, follows from a
three-part division of the observations in the first col-
umn. The mean plus or minus ½ standard deviation
serve as points of demarcation. The classification is
relative and also approximate. Rigidly adhering to the
four-quarter rate of change can mnask changes in policy
that occur within the year. A more exhaustive study
would not be tied to periods offixed length. Nonethe-
less, the classification seems to accord with commnon
interpretationofeconomicexperience; for example, all
of the observations labeled as “tight” occurred near
recession periods.
~1Jf1/ u;-’en.i.eri.t at Fiscal ,~‘1cn•an,s
The measurement of fiscal actions, also has beemu
researched extensively over the years.5 The chiefcon-
clusionfrom this research is that recordedsurpluses or
deficits do not provide an accurate measure of fiscal
actions. The reason is that a considerable amotmnt ofthe
movement of receipts and expenditures reflects an
automatic response to the pace of economic activity
rather than policy actions, Consequently, only fiscal
measures on a high-emuployment basis are con-
sidered.9 These high-employment budget measures
7
Justiflcation for a 20-quarterrate ofchange as a measure oftrend is
found in Denis S. Karnosky. “The Link Between Money and
Prices,” this Review (June 1976), pp. 17—23. See also Keith M.
Carlsom,, “The Lag from Money to Prices,” this Review (October
1980), pp. 3—10.
5
Alan S. Blinder and Robert M. Solow, “Analytical Foundations of
Fiscal Policy,” in Alan S. Blinderand RobertM. Solow, eds., The
EconomicsofPublicFinance(The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp.
3—115.
°Frauk de Leeuw and Thomas M. Holloway, “The High-
Employment Bmmdget: Revised Estimates and Automatic Inflation
Effects,” Survey ofCurrent Business (April 1982), pp. 21—33.
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Table I




Ml ~ Ml EF~4 En20 A’~ E
Year2 Value Class Value Class Value Class Value Class
1958 119 T 584 E 215 N 0.52 T
1957 1.67 T GSa E 463 E 069 E
1958 149 5 1012 5 1005 E 173 5
1959 033 N 671 T 948 T 172 T
1960 039 T 289 P 547 T 107 1
198 119 5 288 N 634 5 1.02 5
1962 030 N 1.75 N 202 N 032 N
1963 175 122 T 151 N 0.33 N
1964 171 58 2 T 196 P4 038 N
1985 091 N 435 5 834 1.48 5
1966 069 1 846 5 201 N 0,48 N
1967 188 5 249 N 346 5 079 5
1968 231 008 N 7S9 1 131 1
1968 tUB T 633 1 5,69 T 14 T
1970 016 N 198 1 659 5 13 5
1971 087 N 1.28 T 129 N 029 N
1972 226 E 683 E 534 51 5
1973 01 N 273 T 760 1 35 T
1974 135 ‘1’ 632 5 343 T 058 T
1975 116 T 293 N 819 16 5
1976 06 N 402 T 209 N 030 N
1977 221 5 022 N 162 N 045 N
1978 177 5 158 T 482 1 081 1
979 041 N 088 N0 2 N 00 N
1980 014 N 556 50 6 N00 N
981 220 T 031 N 124 N 033 N
198 211 1 314 1 482 5 —10
Mean 0 127 047 01
Mean zu 04 106 34 06
Mean 092 354 220 038
Easy N Neutal T Tigh
For definitions of variables see te Ease is associated with relatively large positive v uese cept for
the ight hand pair of fiscal measures For these measu e ease is associated Wi h relatively large
negative values
Al alues are or year endin fourth quarte emtcept for 1982 which is foryear ending second quarter
can h’ ~s nhled i diffe ent say houes.er. Three tu es and the changeofthe surplus o deflet cal d hs
high-c ploxmem t measures are examined: the rate of the si, ofthe econ ins as measu edby potential (,NP.
change of expenditur ‘, minus its trend the rite of The latte two measures sx re’ tested for the presen
hange )f receipts minu. the r te ofchange’ f xpendi of trend but nom e was appa ent.
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The right—hand portion oftable 1 summarizes these other extreme of tight monetary policy and easy fiscal
three fiscal measures over the 1956-to-1982 period, policy occurred in 1957, 1975 and 1982~these were
The rate of change of high-employment expenditures recession years, although all of 1975 is not classified
is included because previous studies have used it as a so according to the National Bureau of Economic
summnary’ fiscal measure even though it does not re— Research.
fleet changes in tax policy. mo The other two high-
emnploymnent measures—the rate ofchange ofreceipts
minus the rate of change of expenditures and the
change in the surplus/deficit scaled by’ potential
CNP—reflect changes in both tax polic~’and expendi-
ture policy’. In general, theselatter two measnresyield
the same classification of easy, tight and neutral.
The current situation (note that 1982 refers to the
fbur quarters ending in second quarter 1982) clearly
falls into theclassification of tight monetary policy’ and
easy’ fiscal policy’. According to the detrencled measure
of monetary’ policy as shown in table 1, 1981 and 1982
are the tightest years fUr monetary’ policy fUrthe 1956—
82 period. The measures offiscal policy’, however, do
not indicate unusual ease. The expenditure measure
does not indicate ease at all, and the other two,
although suggesting ease, do not indicate that the dc—
gree of ease is unusual. There have been six or seven
of the last 27 years (depending on which measure is
used) when fiscal policv~has been easier than in 1982.
The current concern about the mnix of policies,
however, is not focused entirely on the recent past
(note, in particular, the quotations by Brookings and
the Congressional Budget Office above). There is con-
cern about the near future. In other words, given
current trends, analysts seem to he mnost concerned
abommt developing trends in the mnix. Consequently, a
fUll assessment ofpolicy’ mix requires an extrapolation
of trends to determine if the mix ofpolicies appears to
he worsening, that is, that monetary policy’ is tighten-
ing further or at least remaining tight, and that expen-
diture and tax policies are leading to a further easing
of fiscal policy.
Table 2
The Mix of Policy. 1956—82
Monetary Fiscal
1 ight Np_ira’ Easy
light 1956. 1960 1969 1974 1966 ‘YB ‘95/ 1975
982
Ne’Ara’ 1973 959 1962 197 196~‘970
9?6 1979 1980
Easy 968. 1918 1963.1964 97/ 958 19E1
1967 t97~
NOTE Moneiav DOi’cV ,s reasu ad ny fov-aua’te’ -ate o’ change C’ M’ ri,nus 20-cuaie -ato ot
charge Fiscal uo ‘ry is Pleasured by charge in hiqi -erneloymert surplus deficit over four
aba-ters d,v.ried by hIab.errployrnent GNP at the heqinn:nq o’ the oprioo
His/:orica). B.ecard of to. I Mix
The measures of monetary and fiscal policy can he
combined to give a classification of each year in terms
of the mix of those policies. Table 2 provides this
summary’ on the basis of detrencled Ml and the high—
employment surplus/deficit measure of fiscal action.
The years shown in the corners ofthis mnatrix are mnost
revealing. Periods when both policieswere tight clear-
ly’ were associated with recessions; those when both
were easy’ were associated with economic expansion.
Theperiods ofcontrasting policies, though fewin numn—
her, are interesting nonetheless. Easy’ nmonetary policy
and tight fiscal policy occtmrred only’ in 1968 and 1978,
both expansion years before business cycle peaks. Tbe
‘°SeeLcomiall C. Amidersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “Mommetary and
Fiscal Actions: A Test of‘Fheir Relative Importance in Economic
Stabilization,” this Renew (Novcmbc’r 1968), pp. 11—24.
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Figure 1
Determination ot Real Income, Interest Rate and Investment-Saving Ratio
IX)
IS curve depicts equilibrium in goods and services
market.







Investment and saving curves are drawn for gven
level of real income (X).
i)E\.:rFLC)P • “i’ O~F’TiilE. NIJX
Ii ~ I I i.~S I~i < toll ~
<)f•~ ANA1XSIS
The qmmestion of polic~’ mix is broad, encompassing a
large body’ of macroeconomic theory’ and empirical
support for the theom’ . Since a broad review of the
theoryis thuspi-ohihitive,a typical examnplefrom mac-





The notion of policy’ mix usually’ is explained by’
using the well—known Hicksian IS—LM framework.
According to this framnework, the level of economic
activity’(real income) and the level of interest rates are
cletermnined by’ the conjtmnction of conditions in tsvo
See, for example, Robert J. Gordon , ,%Irwroecoaoones, 2nd ed.
(Little, Brown and Company. I98th pp 140—42; or William H.
Branson and James Ni. Litvaclc, .%Iocroecononnc,s, 2nd ed, (liar—
per and Row Puhlishers, 1981), pp. 86—90.
aggregate markets: the market for goods and services
amid the market for money’. m2 Fiscal policy, that is,
changes in federal expendittmres and tax rates, in-
fluence the economliv throtmgh themarket for goodsand
services, while monetary’ policy’ sx’orks through the
money market.
The IS—LM model is summarized in figure 1. The IS
curve is the locus of combinations of interest rate and
real economic activity’ consistent with equilibrium in
the goods and services market. The curve is down-
ward—sloping becauselower interestrates induce high-
er levels of investment, which increase real income
through the mnultiplier. Including the federal govern-
ment in the analysis broadens the eqmmilibrium condi-
tion to investment plus government purchases equals
savings plus taxes. The right—hand panel shows explic-
itly’ the sitm.mation in the goods and services market that
underlies the IScurve in the left—handpanel. Although
in reality 1)0th savings and investment depend on real
m2
1
n the sinmplcst version ol’the IS—LM nmodel, thereis no distinction
madehetween nominal an ml real interest rates because the print’
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Figure 2
Policy Nix and lie IS-tN Framework
® Tight monetary policy (M,<M) and easy fiscal
policy (G1>G).
e Easy monetary policy (M2>M) and tight fiscal
policy (02<0).
income, the curvesaredrawnhereonlywith reference
to the equilibrium level ofincome.
The LM curve, as shown in figure 1, is the locus of
combinationsofinterest rateandreal economicactiv-
fly consistent with equilibrium in the money market.
Money isdefinedas currency plus checkabledeposits.
The curve is upward-sloping because the demand lbr
real balances is assumed to be negatively related to
interest rates and positively related to real income.
Consequently, in order 1kw the demand 1kw real bal-
ances to be equal to a fixed supply, an increased de-
mand for money balances as real income increases
must be offsetby reduceddemandfor money balances
via higher interest rates.
Real income and interest rates are determined
simultaneously by the intersection of the IS and LM
curves. Only thiscombinationofinterest rate andreal
income is consistent with equilibrium in both the
goods and services and money markets. The way that
this equilibrium combination changes in response to
monetary and fiscalactions is of interest here.
Fiscal actions affect equilibrium by shifting the IS
curve, while monetary actions shift the LM curve.
Consequently, a given level of real income can be
achieved with different combinations, or mixes, of
monetary and fiscalactions. For example, in figure 2,
the combination of IS1 and LM1 represents “easy”
fiscalpolicy and “tight” monetary policy, and a given
level ofreal income isachievedwithahigherinterest
rate than at the original equilibrium. Similarly, the
intersection ofIS2 and LM2reflects “fight fiscalpolicy
and “easy” monetary policy. “High” interest rates
imply a lower rate ofprivate investment (see right-
hand panel) and thus signify slower economicgrowth
over the long tenn than a set ofpolicies that yields
“low” interest rates.
Within the context ofthe current economic situa-
tion, the implication seems to be that the U.S. econ-
omy is operating at a point correspondingto the in-
tersection of IS1 and LM1. This interpretation, how-
ever, is not obvious. Bather, Tobin and Brcokings
economists seem to drawthe conclusion that the eco-
nomic recovery cannotbe started or sustained unless
interest rates are reducedby changingthe mix ofpoli-
cies. This interpretation suggests that they view the
IS-LM framework in dynamic rather than in static
terms. In other words, the level of real income and
interest ratesare beingmovedover timebyacombina-
tion of policies in such a way that interest rates are
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Figure 3
Inhlafionary Expectations and the ~S-1M Framework
—a
Expected. Inflation and the IS-Li. :1 iWod.eI
The version of the IS-LM model discussed above is
based on a number ofsimplifying assumptions. One of
the most important simplifications is that inflation and
expectations ofinflation canhe ignored. It wouki seem
that any discussion of current economic developments
should be based on a framework that allows for the
effect of expected inflation.
The effect of introducmg expectations into the IS—
LM model is shown in figure 3. The interest rate axis
now represents both nominal and real interest rates.
~ represents equilibrium in the goods~~£1I~(l services
market with expected inflation equal to zero (implying
nominal and real interest r~ites~ ~ire the same). The
effect of introducing expected inflation of some posi-
tive amount is to shift the IS curve upward and to the
right with respect to nommal rates, but leave it un-
changed in terms of real rates. The reason fhr this is
that consumption and investment decisions are
assumed to be based on realrather than nominal rates
of interest. This means that ~s1 is raised above IS0 by
the amount of expected inflation.
The effect on the LXI curve of introducing expected
inflation is somewhat more complicated. If, for exam—
pIe, the demand for real balances depends on the
difference between rates of return on money and all
other assets, then expected inflation will afThct all of
these rates of return equall~’,including the return on
real balances, and the LXI curve will not he affected
when drawn in terms of the nominal interest rate. If
theassumption ofequal efli~cts ofexpected inflationon
all asset returns is relaxed, however, the results will
differ. An increase in expected inflation generally
can he expected to increase the nominal return on
capital relative to bonds and money. W~ealth—bolders
will attempt to rearrange their portfhlios to hold more
capitaland less money and bonds. Prices ofcapital will
rise as those on bonds fall; that is, interest rates will
rise. This means the LM curve will shiftupward when
drawn with reference to the nominal rate ofinterest.
Because all wealth is not affhcted by a change in ex-
pectations, however, the upward shiftofthe LM curve
will be less than the change in expected inflation.
The effect on policy mix of introducing expectations
into the IS-LM model depends on the response of
expectations toany change inpolicy. If expectationsdo
not change in response to a shift in policy, the mixcan
be changed as in the basic model- A given level of
incomecan be achievedwith different combinations of
policies and different interest rates. On the other
band, ifexpectations are responsive toeither monetary
or fiscal actions. a larger number of possibilities is
introduced, depending on the nature of the expecta-
tions response. In general, the faster expectations
react to actual changesin monetaryor fiscal policy, the
less the efl’ect of policy changes on the real variables,
that is, real income, real interest rates and the invest-
ment ratio.
T.ESTI.NG Ti••IE \fL HYPOTHE 8.15
The IS—LM framework providc~sa rationale for
assigning the mix of policy an important role in plan-
ning the course of economicactivity. Though thereare
many problems involved in movingfrom theclassroom
blackboard to economic reality, tbe general framework
can still serve as a guide informulating a test of the mix
hypothesis -
Testing Pracei:hsre
The question of policy mix focuses on the aggrega—
tive eflects of monetary and fiscal actions and thus
lends itself to a reduced—form approach to hypothesis
testing. 13 The details of the transmission mechanism
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Inflationary expectations (P’~-0) push op nominal
interest rate (i), but by less than pE,
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Table 3
Variables Used in Regressions
Dependent variable Monetary Fiscal
Ma.corporate Aaa Ml compounded annual E~’compounded annual
bond rate rate of change of rate of change of high
money stock narrowly employment federal
defined expenditures
Aaa P Aaa rate
minus 4-year rate
of change of GNP
deflator R° E~. compounded
annual rate of change
of high employment
federal receipts minus
k~ compounded annual the rate of change of
rate of change of high-employment
real GNP expenditures
Ac) change in the ratio Ms/DY change in the
of fixed investment high employment
to ONP federal su plus
deficit divided by
high employment ONP
NOTE All variables are expressed in percent terms
ft d) n apolici action to economic -ictis its are of second dct i mined hi san ii g the lag bs nultiples offour audi
ai interest a. is the process bs ss hicli inflationars cb osing from these caressions di i he h’ sis of ma —
xpectations aeformed Rither the chief cone rn is imum djustecl R’. The -klmd ii lag technique ssa used
I ether cc tim s dues of key x,onoinic ariables can s~ ith the coefficients constrais ed to he on a third—
he hR seel ith difl ic nt cot ibinatmom s of monetars degree p01’nc miual siitb i a ii on tr i t. These c> ti—
and fiscal actions. mates xi re sted igainst the unre trictc dl Ic ast—
-. . . squares cstisnates to ens re t at the smoothness
‘I h x a tables used in the anals sis and s immarized -
-. . ass unption could not lie ej ct ci Iii the data.
in table 3 are rc st set dl to those nnphc it in the IS—LM
frames cirk. Tb el ~pendent satiahles ar • sc al ( \ P
ea and i omutal inte est rates and the atio if fi ed
is estincnt t G\ P. rhese s in bles ii e e regs essed
on ci rent a id Ia r ‘clxals es oftbc i 0iet~ s md fiscal
ti-chIc ~The s egi c ions md Isma inter t rite
dIes onstr-ited s list’ i tial autocor ~latio i i tI re—
sidu-ils so t iese equat on is idjustecl Ising the
Coch -fl —Os cutt roc -dlure. Al dither eq tations iscrc
est mated is ith or~l ii . s least sq iares. Lag k nct i ssas
“Although N-f I so inus tresid was usect in table 1 in deBoing the
tatice of inonetarv pohcv, )O I xvithenit tietie
1
adjustni eUt \“as used
in the regressiosis, iiiainix because of its sinsliie interpretation -
Explaining the ci uarter— to—i jsiarter variation of a variable is little
affected by thischoice, except for the value of the constant tcrus,
Tables 4—7 summarize the statistical results. The
eflbcts of the po1~cyvariables cm time relevant depen-
dent variable are summarized as one-year effect, txyo-
year effect and full eflCct. The final column, lauded
“mix effect,’’ oftables 4—7 is of particular interest here.
The mix effect is defined as the percentage change in
Mi that would lie reqcnred to offset a tighter fiscal
policy and keel) the dependent varialile constant. A
tighter fiscal policy is defined as a decrease in federal
spending that would increase the change in the high—
employment lmudget imy 65 billion for 1.960 and1 1961.
An appendix provides the specifics of how this tighter
fiscal policy is defined.
14FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 1982
Table 4
Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Actions on the Aaa Bond Rate
Sample Period: l1/1959’-IV/1981
Monetary Effect Fiscal Effect
Dependent Sum of Sum of Mix
variable Vanable Lags coefficients Variable Lags coefficients Constant El2 DW Rho effect
Ma Ml 3 i14 EH 3 010 (Jndef
7 394 7 030 0
20 1395 6 098 1539 17 174 99 0
(449) (124) (51)
Ma g%l 3 118* frEH 3 017 0
7 401 7 054 0
24 1750 16 101 1103 8 174 29 0
(492) (140 (36)
AtS D~1~
Ma Ml 3 106 ‘H’ 3 541 Undef
7 363 ‘~ 7 1517 0
24 1725 16 2931 1178 20 177 99 0
(496) (1 80) (40)
1Sums are cumulative fo numberof lagsindicated Absolute valueoft statistic in parentheses * indica es sum is significant at 5 percent
level 2Mixeffect isthechange in Ml (in pe centage points) required tooffset a tightening offiscalpolicy in theform ofan increase in A(S D)u of
$5 billion To offset means to keep the dependent variable unchanged See appendi for details Undef” means the mix effect is
undefined neither themonetary o fiscal effect i significantly different f om zero (5 percent level)
Nominal interest rates and policy rnix—Many in monetary policy shifts the IS curve to the left, lead-
analysts consider the level of nominal interest rates to ing to a fall in interest rates. To keep interest rates
he the primarycauseforthe current economicmalaise. unchanged, monetary policy would have to lie tight-
Yet the IS-LM model depicts the interest rate as a ened, shifting the LM curye to the left. Consequently,
dependent variable. So, the firstquestion investigated the implication of the simple IS-LM model is that the
here is whether the nominalinterest rate is systemnati- “mix effect” would he negative.
eally related to monetary-fiscal actions. The rela- . --
-. The results in table4 are clear-cut. The mix effect is tmonshmp of the corporate Aaa bond rate to the selected .. H
-- . either zero or undefined. The effect ofF on interest measures of monetars’ and fiscal policy is summarized . .., .-
- hi’ 4 -- rates is of the expected sign, hut not significantly dif- in ta . ferent from zero. In the case of both RH — E~5and
Three regressions were run, corresponding to the ~S/DH
-- . p , the effect on interest rates is not of the cx—
three measures offiscal action. The number oflags that X:~
m iximnizedthe adjuste el R2of the equ ition r mge d from pected sign but is ilso not significant N tigbtcsnug of
20 to 24 fhr N-Il and was 16 Ihr the fiscal variable. The .- - n _______
- fiscal polmcv. that is an umcrease ofR — E or n
results are summarized as one-yeareffects (current and -- —
three lags), two-year effects (current and seven lags), is associated with an increase in interest rates. The
andl the full effect, xvhich takes into account all of the effectof monetary policy omi interest rates in all eases is
lags. Relevant summary statistics also are show-mi. positive, running contrary to the implication of the
-. . simple IS-LM model.
Aecordmng to the simple IS—LM interpretation as
shown in figure 2, a tighter fiscal policy should he In general, fiscal policyhas no effecton the Aaabond
accompanied by a tighter monetary policy in order to rate;thus, there is nomix efihct. Theeffect ofmonetary
keep interest rates unchanged. Resnemnher that the expansion, on the other hand, builds up over time and
model of figure 2 ignores the influence of price cx- appears to lie permanent. These results suggest that it
pectations. A tightening of fiscal policy with no change is necessary to augmnent the IS—LM snoclel with price
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Table 5
Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Actions on a Proxy for the Real Interest Rate
Sample Period. fl11959—IV/1981
Monetary Effect Fiscal Effect
Dependent Sum of Sum of Mix
variable Variable Lags coefficIents Variable Lags coefficients Constant A2 DW Rho effecP
Aaa~8 f~t 3 114 E 3 010 Undef
7 S30 7 022 0
16 698 16 009 105 04 179 98 0
(313) (11) (06)
Aaa P, Ml 3 116* Rh.i EH 3 009 0
7 321 7 018 0
20 846 16 015 558 08 182 99 0
(290) (21) (27)
Ma ~~ ttl 3 111 A(SIDr 3 202 Undef
7 299 7 604 0
20 798 16 385 393 08 181 98 0
(278) (.24) (21)
Sums are cumulative forriumbe of lags indicated Absolutevalue oft statistic in parentheses. * indicates sum issignificant at 5 percent
Mix effect is the change in M (in percentage points) requ red to offset a tightening of fiscal policyin the formof an increase in ,S(Sp)ii of
$5 billion To offset means to keep the dependent variable unchanged See appendix for detail Undef means the mix effect is
undefined neither the monetaiy or fiscal effect s significantly different rom zero (5 percen evel)
expectations, when thoseexpectations seem todepend cant for any of the three measures. As with nominal
on the rate of monetary expansion. The explanatory rates, there is no mix effect applicable to the real rate.
power of each of the three equations is dominated by
the rate of change of money. - In general, monetary and fiscal actions do little to
-- - explain the movement of the real rate as measured by
Real interest rates and policymix—Recent concern the Aaa bond rate minus past inflation. To the extent
about the level ofinterest rates -also has been couched that the equation has explanatorypower, it comes from
in terms (if the real rate.’5 Many consider the current themonetary variable. Even that effect runs counter to
high level of real rates an obstacle to economic recov- the conventional wisdom, as might he implied by an
cry. Since real rates are not observable, however, expectations-augmented IS-LM model. More expan-
proxies have to be developed. Although much work sionary monetary policy is associated with increases in
has been done, the simple proxy of a nominal rate the real rate. Such an effect should probably not be
minus the recent rateofinflation is still most common- taken too seriously, however, because ofthe problems
ly used. For this analysis, the realrate is proxiecl by the inherent in measuring the real rate.
Aaa bond rate minus the rate of change of the CNP Outputgrowthand policymix—Another interpreta-
deflator over the four previous years. tion ofthe mix problem is that output growth is being
The results are summarized in table 5, fbllowing the retarded by the particular combination of policies in
same format as before. The explanatory power ofeach effect. The next set ofregressions examines the rate of
equation is very low, although the monetary effect is output growth as a function ofthe monetary and fiscal
significant in each case. The fiscal effect is not signifi- variables. These results are summarized in table 6.
The monetary and fiscal variables explain between
______ 35 and 40 percent of the movement of output growth,
‘3See in particular, the study Iiy the Congressional Budget Office and no correction for serial correlation is necessary.
cited in footnote 3. What is apparent from these regressions is the impor-
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Table 6
Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Actions on the Rate of Output Growth
Sample Period: l1f1959—IV/1981
Monetary Effect Fiscal Effect
Dependent Sum of Sumof Mix
variable Variable Lags coefficients’ Variable Lags coefficients’ Constant R DW Rho effect2
SC t~tl 3 1010* El~ 3 030 0
7 434 7 092 Undef.
20 001 12 307 6055 .39 2.28 NA Undef
(01 (170) (483)
Sc t~ti 3 1 008 fr EH 3 .082 0
7 520 7 082 Undef
20 301 12 020 4506 37 220 NA Undef
(161) (12) (461)
X P~ll 3 1076 3 2776 0
7 670 7 3129 Undef
20 278 12 945 4279 39 225 NA. Undef
(156) (24) (451)
tSums are cumulative for number oflags md cated Absolute valu oft-statistic in parentheses indicatessum is significant at 5 percent
level 2Mixeffect isthechange in Ml (in percentage points) required to offset a tightening offiscal policy in theform of an increase in A(S
0
)H of
$5 billion To offset means to keep the dependent vanable unchanged See appendix for details “Undef’~means the mix effect is
undefined; neither the monetary or fiscal effect a significantlydifferent from zero(5 percent level).
tance ofthe length of horizon. Money growth stimu- lime striking feature of these regressions is that the
lates output growth in the short run, hut this stimulus explanatory power of these equations is quite high,
fades after a year. Consequently, any potential mix with about 55 percent ofthe niovement in the invest-
effect is applicable only in the short rmin, hut none is ment ratio explained by the monetary and fiscal van-
found because the fiscal effect on output is not signifi- ables. Also, no correction for serialcorrelation isneces-
cantly different fromn zero. sary. l’he effect of monetary policy on the investment
ratio is first positive, then negative (shown liv a decline
rIseconventional wmsdom indicates that a tightening ., . . . -
in the sum ofcoefficients as the horizon is lengthened)-
offiscal policy shouldhe accompaniedby an expansion- .. . . u
only in comhmnation wmth E ms the effect signmflcant
ary monetary policy in order to achieve a given rate of
- .. after 20 quarters. The fiscal effect, on the other hamid,
output growth. The directions ofthe effects are gener- ..
builds up over time and ms significant at the 9a per-
ally found, lint, because the fiscal effect is not signifi-
- ., . cent level after 16 quarters for each of the three fiscal
cantly different from zero, there is no mix effect. And, .~ ~-
for the long term, the mnix effect is undefined because \-ariaoies.
neither the effects of monetary or fiscal actiomms are
significantly different from zero. .
- The mix effectfor the investment ratio, according to
Investment ratio and policymix—A final variable of conventional wisdom, should he negative. A tighten-
interest to those concerned with the current mix of ingoffiscal policy shouldhe accompanied by a tighten-
policies is the investmnent ratio. Easy fiscal policy is ingof monetary policy in order to keep the investment
thought to discourage private investment because the ratio constant. That is, a tightening of fiscal policy is
federalgovernment preenmpts theuse ofloanable funds supposed to encourage investmnemmt; if that is to he
(see figure 2). To investigate this effect, the change in offset. monetary policy also should he tightened. For
the ratio offixed investment to GNP is run against the all cases in table 7, the conventionalwisdom is upheld.
monetary and fiscal variables. Table 7 summarizes the But, asthe horizon is lengthened, there reallyis no mix
results. effect, because monetary actions do not have a perma-
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Table 7
Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Actions on the Investment Ratio
Sample Period: lI/1959—lVf1981
Monetary Effect Fiscal Effect
Dependent Sum of Sum of Mix
variable Variable Lags coefficients Variable Lags coefficients Constant R2 DW Rho effec9
f~11 3 085* 5” 3 016* 07
7 045 7 024
20 048 12 032 080 55 236 NA 22
(262) (291) (1.04)
AQ/Y) ~l 3 096k ~ E 3 009 04
7 050 7 020
20 000 12 034 017 56 236 N.A
(.02) (340) (30)
A(ITY) t~t 3 099 3 177 0
7 051 7 412~
20 009 12 699 042 55 2.28 NA
(.82) (288) (71)
1Sums are cumulative for number of lags indicated Absolutevalue oft statistic in parentheses indicates sum Is significant at 5 percent
level
2Mix effect is the change in g11 (in percentage points) required to offset a tightening offiscal policy in the formof an increase in X(S/D)” of
$5 billion Tooffset means tokeepthe dependentvariable unchanged See appendix fordetails meansthe mix effect is infinite that is, a
nonzero effect is divided byzero the fiscal effect is significant but the monetary effect is not (5 percent level)
nent effecton the investnu mit ratio, while fiscal actions higher, not lower. The implication for real rates is not
do (this result is shown a ~). clear; even though realrates si-c e positively related to
money growth, the regressions were miotsignificant. To
the extent that interest rat scan he explained, money
growth, not fiscal actions, prom ides the explanation. An
These regression results carr~certaui nnplications easing offiscal policy alone does not guarantee a fall in
for economic policm that aea tmaniance with the con- interest rates. The eft~ctof fiscal actions on interest
ventional wisdom on polic\ mix. The g mu n-il policy rates was not found to he significant.
implications of the statistical results require further
discussion. To givesome indication ofthe magnitude of Theidea (ifasolid recoveryis thatrealoutput growth
effect, some different polic\ mixes are simnulatid for could be stimulated liv shifting the mix toward tighter
the period from 1981 to 1985. fiscal policy amid easier monetary policy. The regres-
sion results indicate that this desired effect could lie
Gem-ru! Po/Icq impheutiour achieved, but only temporarily. Easier monetary pol-
icy stimulates output gromvth initially, but this effect
These regression ii stilts can he pulled togeth r into dissip ites after a veam Furthermore the regression
a general conclusion. Consider Toliin 5 reconimenda- results indicate that fiscal effects on outliut growth are
tion, cited at the heginning of this paper: not significant, either in the short or long rim.
To achieve a solid recover’-, such as the administration ,
projects, and toaclneveit ~vithoutastronomical interest Tohin s recommendation has some validity in its
rates and serious crowding out, we need an easier assertion that the mix should lie changed to avoid
monetary policy combined with a tighter fiscal policy- serious crowding out. ‘‘~~ According to the regression
What light do these regression results shed on tins
recommendation? First, if easier monetary policy -- - ,, -
-. . ‘ “For asurvey article on crowding out, see Keith NI - Carlsonand means faster money growth, followingTohmn 5 recom- liogem W. ~pencer. Crowding Out and Its Critics.” tins Review
memsdation will yield nominal interest rates that are (D~cemnberi975), ~i~i 2-47.
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Table 8
Simulation of Alternative Policy Mixes
Easy Fiscal Policy Tight Fiscal Policy Tight Fiscal Policy
and and and
Tight Monetary Policy Tight Monetary Policy Easy Monetary Policy
CorporateAaa Bond Rate
1981 Actual 14.17% 1417% 1417%
1982 1426 14.28 14.39
1983 1301 13.26 13.78
1984 1137 1200 13.16
1985 999 1087 12.82
Growth Rate of Real GNP
1981 Actual 080% 0 80% 0.80%
1982 013 0.35 136
1983 2,16 110 284
1984 3.10 214 2.54
1985 3.67 3.41 2.83
Investment Ratio
1981 Actual 1536% 1536% 1536%
1982 1462 14,64 1500
1983 1396 1419 1524
1984 1343 1416 1548
1985 1295 1452 1573
NOTE Easy fiscal policy is a steady increase of the high employment deficit to$150 billion in fiscal 1985
Tight fiscal policy is a steady movement toward a balanced high employment budget in fiscal 1985.
Easy monetary policy is 6.5 percent growth rate of Ml
Tight monetary policy is 4.5 percent growth rate of Ml
results, tighter fiscal policy would indeed encourage a fiscal policy that yields a balanced high—employmnemit
rise in theinvestment ratio, limit interest rates would he budget by 198.5. The easy policy conforms roughlvwith
mninimally affected. This shift to tighter fiscal policy, the prospective course of fiscal action as it appeared to
however, need notbe accompanied hy easier monetary he developing in early 1982. The tight policy is consis-
policy. There isa positive effect ofmomietary actions on tent with a recouimendation liv the Brookings Institu—
the investment ratio, but it appears to he temporary. tion in their annual report omi the federal liudget. 15,
whereas the fiscal effect appears to he permanent.
Two monetary policies were simulated: one is a
-- steady expansion of Ml at a 4.5 liercent rate, the other
e~mwuUwuof Aiternuiire Pout-u Mixes is expansion at a 6.5 percent rate. The first pohc~is
labeled “tight” and ~~‘onldhe within the 1982 target
To provide some specific indication of the inagni— range announced by the Federal Reserve. The 6.5
tudes imivolved iii the policy miiix controversy, the re- percent scenario formoney is called “easy,” andwould
gression results were used to simulate three different be above the upper end of the 1982 target range.
nines of iioltc~foi the 1982—85 pcrmod Point stun ites
of the coefficients were used even if they were not Table 8 gives the results of these simulations. The
significantly difiCrent from zero, iT ‘ result of tightening fiscal policy and easing monetary
policy (compare the first and third columns) is to push
Tmvo fiscal scenarios were chosen; one is based on up nominal interest rates. The growth of output is
fiscal actions that lead to a 8150 billion deficit in the
high—emplovmnent budget liv 1985, the other a tiahter -~ -- -. -- -- -. -
- . -, See- Chamles L. Schulize. Loug—Tei-mn Lmudge-t Strategies, in
J,iseph A - i’eeh nan- ccl-- Se U iug Netis,flu? Ps-jo m-itic-s: T/ieI
— Budge! The Brnol-ciugs lnstitutiuu, 1982s, pp. i-S7——220. Their
- Real hits- -es rats-s were n,s siinnInted I ,eeat,si- font-ofthe re-gm-es- reef nimuendat mc, n was mnails’before passage of Ume Tax Equmt~ and
Sbus was significant. Fiscal Responsihuitv -Sc-c ol 1982.
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actuallyworsenedby thechange in the mix, the reason
being that inflation accelerates with easier monetary
policy. Theinvestmentratio, however, is increasedby
changing the mix of policy. As the middle column of
table8 shows, there islittle to be gained byexpanding
money more rapidly when fiscal policy is tightened.
Although easing monetary policy appears desirable
because of its beneficial effects on fixed investment,
recall thatthe long-runeffects ofmoney growthon the
investment ratio were not statistically different from
zero.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The notion of policy mix has been presented in
textbooksand discussed by eminentanalysts almost as
ifitwerea self-evident truth. Arecommended change
in policy mix seems to be based on the well-known
IS-LM model. When scrutinized more closely, the
questionoftheappropriate mix ofmonetary-fiscalpoli-
cies is not as clear-cut as the simple IS-LM model
implies. The lagged effects of policy actions must be
takeninto account, aswellas the empirical realities of
certain economic relationships.
This paper examined thur dependentvariablesthat
seem relevant in any discussion ofpolicy mix—nomi-
nal interestrates, real interestrates, the rateofoutput
growth, andthe investment ratio. Theconclusions are
as follows:
(1) Movementsofnominal interestratesand, toalesser
extent, real rates are dominated by monetary actions.
Theeffectoffiscalactionson interestratesisnot statisti-
cally significant.
(2) There is a short-run effect of monetary actions on
outputgrowth, but itis only temporary. Overthe long
run, movements In output growth are unaffected by
either monetary or fiscal actions.
(3) The investment ratio is influenced temporarily by
monetary actions, but the effect appears to be penna-
nent for fiscal actions.
These conclusions implythat the IS-LMframework
must becarefullyinterpreted when usedas aguide for
policy analysis, and that current recommendationsfbr
a change in the mix are only partly valid. Fiscal policy
should indeed be lightened in order to stimulate an
increasein theinvestment ratio,iflong-term economic
growth and/or housing investment is a national goal.
There is little evidence, however, to support the no-
tionthatinterestrateswouldbeaffectedgreatly. There
isno basis lbr thinkingthat atighteningoffiscal policy
should be accompanied by an easing of monetary
policy. The efl~ct ofeasier monetary policy would be
higher nominal interest rates and only a temporary








Change in Fiscal Policy Used in Calculating Mix Effect
Actual Fiscal Policy (High-Employment Values) Tighter Fiscal Policy (High-Employment Values)
—.-—.—--— ———————--———--————.——————— -4
Receipt Expenditures Surplus/Detici Receipts Expenditures surplus/Deficit
Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change
(A
1980! $5423 $145 $5606 $251 $18.3 $108 $5423 $145 $5556 $201 $133 $58
II 5575 152 5793 187 17 34 ~575 152 569.3 137 117 16
III 5801 22.8 6044 251 242 2 5801 26 5894 201 92 25
IV 8135 334 6303 259 168 74 6135 334 6103 20.9 32 1 4
1981! 6502 367 6514 211 13 155 6502 367 626.4 161 37 205
II 663.3 131 6528 4 106 119 6633 131 6228 36 40.6 189
Ill 6847 214 6804 276 43 83 6847 214 6454 226 39.3 1.3
IV 6883 36 122 3 .8 40 263 6883 36 6722 268 160 233
no change $5 billion difference
For the Ii cal variables used in the regressions this change in policy translate a follows
(S/D)H
ii ~H ~
1st year 3.74 +374 19
2nd year 328 328 18
Beyond 2nd year 328 3.28 18
0 C) —I
0
w m
I0
-S F’)